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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 44055 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2006-125 
v.     ) 
     ) 
JOLENE MARIE CARUSO, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Jolene Caruso contends the district court abused its discretion by denying her 
oral motion for a sentence reduction (hereinafter, Rule 35 motion) when it revoked 
probation and executed her sentence following a probation violation.  She asserts the 
district court did not give sufficient consideration to the mitigating factors in the record.  
As such, this Court should reduce her sentence as it deems appropriate, or, 
alternatively, remand this case for a new disposition determination. 
 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
As defense counsel explained at the most recent disposition hearing, “This is an 
old probation case.  It has been going on since 2006.  We have over nine years at this 
2 
point.”  (Tr., p.11, Ls.13-15.)  Ms. Caruso was initially sentenced to a unified term of ten 
years, with two years fixed, for grand theft, to be served concurrently with a sentence 
from an unrelated case.1  (R., pp.107-08.)  That sentence was suspended for a period 
of probation following her successful completion of a rider program during a period of 
retained jurisdiction.2  (R., pp.33-34, 37; Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, 
PSI), pp.72-74.) 
After successfully serving six years on probation, Ms. Caruso’s probation officer 
requested the district court authorize unsupervised probation because Ms. Caruso “has 
satisfactorily complied with the terms of her probation and is functioning as a socially 
acceptable, self-supporting member of society.  Record checks have been completed 
and it appears she has refrained from further criminal activity.  All court costs and fines 
have been paid in full.  The defendant has maintained full time employment.”  (R., p.46.)  
Alongside the court costs and fines, Ms. Caruso had also paid restitution in the amount 
of $6,267.43.3  (R., p.47; see R., pp.53-77 (records of Ms. Caruso’s payments).)  She 
had gotten married, and she and her husband were starting a new life with their 
children.  (R., p.47.)  The district court granted the request to place Ms. Caruso on 
unsupervised probation.  (R., p.44.) 
                                            
1 Like this case, the other initial sentence had been for a unified term of ten years, with 
two years fixed, but it has since been reduced to a unified term of five years, with two 
years fixed.  (See Tr., p.12, Ls.1-4.)  That sentence is not on appeal here. 
2 The minutes of the rider review hearing indicate the term of probation was to be for 
seven years (R., p.37), but the order revoking probation stated it was for a term of ten 
years.  (R., p.38.)   
3 The restitution order was joint and several with Ms. Caruso’s co-defendant from the 
underlying theft case.  (R., p.37.) 
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Things started to change when Ms. Caruso subsequently suffered a back injury.  
(See, e.g., PSI, p.8 (her husband’s statement to the presentence investigator).)  That 
injury resulted in Ms. Caruso losing her job because she could not do the work.  (PSI, 
p.10.)  She was prescribed Oxycontin by one of her doctors, and that triggered a 
relapse.4  (PSI, p.10.)  Although her husband tried to give Ms. Caruso the benefit of the 
doubt, when he learned she had been lying about her drug use, their marriage fell apart.  
(PSI, p.8.)  Rather than seeking help, Ms. Caruso admitted she allowed the relapse to 
continue.  (See PSI, p.11.)  Ultimately, a motion for probation violation was filed alleging 
Ms. Caruso had been charged with a new offense of theft for switching price tags on 
some items, which Ms. Caruso explained she hoped to give her children as birthday 
gifts, but could not otherwise afford.  (R., pp.79, 91.) 
Ms. Caruso admitted that probation violation, and the district court retained 
jurisdiction again.  (R., pp.107-08.)  Ms. Caruso completed all the assigned programs 
during her rider and had no disciplinary actions filed against her.  (PSI, pp.51-56.)  As a 
result, Ms. Caruso’s sentence was suspended for another three years of probation.  
(R., pp.112-14.) 
Unfortunately, this period of probation was not as successful as her first.  Several 
months in, the State filed a motion for probation violation alleging multiple violations of 
the terms of her probation, including that she had committed several new offenses, not 
completed treatment, absconded supervision, and used methamphetamine and 
marijuana.  (R., pp.117-19, 139-42.)  Ms. Caruso ultimately admitted to several of those 
                                            
4 During her rider program, a drug screening tool revealed that Ms. Caruso had 
substance abuse issues with methamphetamine and marijuana.  (PSI, p.334.)  She 
admitted to struggling with her addictions since age 13.  (PSI, p.214.)   
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violations.5  (Tr., p.5, Ls.6-9.)  At the disposition hearing, Ms. Caruso expressed her 
remorse and accepted responsibility for her actions, recognizing they stemmed from her 
continued drug use and that she “had the tools to remain sober.  I chose not to use 
them.”  (Tr., p.12, Ls.18-20.)  The prosecutor recommended Ms. Caruso’s sentence be 
executed in this case, noting that Ms. Caruso’s other initial sentence, as well as a new 
sentence for one of the new offenses, had already been executed.  (Tr., p.9, Ls.11-17.)  
Defense counsel did not disagree with that recommendation, but he did explain that the 
district court judge addressing the other initial sentence had reduced the indeterminate 
term of that sentence.  (Tr., p.12, Ls.1-4.)  As such, he moved the district court in this 
case do the same or commute the sentence in this case altogether.  (Tr., p.12, Ls.5-16.)   
The district court denied Ms. Caruso’s motion to reduce her sentence, explaining, 
“I don’t believe -- except in very unusual cases -- in adjusting a sentence that was 
suspended when a person violates especially when they commit new offenses.”  
(Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.2.)  The district court also pointed out that Ms. Caruso would be 
getting credit for time served (ultimately calculated to be 595 days), which “[a]ffects the 
base on my case pretty substantially.”  (Tr., p.14, Ls.4-5; R., p.172.)   Therefore, it 
decided “a long period of time of supervision is wise; particularly when this is a case 
where it looks like you dropped your guard and just went back to using totally in a fairly 
late stage in the game.  And so that kind of makes me think that it would be prudent to 
keep an eye on things.”  (Tr., p.14, Ls.5-11.)  Accordingly, it revoked Ms. Caruso’s 
                                            
5 It does not appear those admissions were part of a plea agreement, as no terms of 
such an agreement were put on the record.  (See generally R., Tr.) 
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probation and executed her sentence without modification.  (R., pp.171-72.)  
Ms. Caruso filed a notice of appeal timely from that order.  (R., pp.174-75.) 
 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Caruso’s Rule 35 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Caruso’s Rule 35 Motion 
For Sentence Reduction 
 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 is addressed 
to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency 
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.  
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).  “The criteria for examining rulings 
denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether 
the original sentence was reasonable.”  State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 
1994).  As such, the Court should evaluate whether a lesser sentence would serve the 
goals of sentencing:  (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the 
public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing.  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997).  The protection of society is 
the primary objective the court should consider.  State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 
500 (1993).  However, the Idaho Supreme Court has also held that rehabilitation 
“should usually be the initial consideration in the imposition of the criminal sanction.”  
State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in 
State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015). 
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In this case, the mitigating factors demonstrate a sentence reduction would best 
serve all the goals sentencing.  After all, this case has been ongoing for nearly the same 
length of time as just serving the initial underlying sentence would have.  (Compare 
R., pp.107-08 (imposing an unified ten-year sentence); with Tr., p.11, Ls.14-15 (defense 
counsel noting, at the most recent disposition hearing, the case had been proceeding 
for nine years).)  Ms. Caruso has shown some ability to be a successful and contributing 
member of society, completing nearly seven years during her first term of probation 
without a violation.  (See R., p.38 (order suspending sentence entered on November 1, 
2006); R., p.79 (motion for probation violation alleging a violation occurring on 
August 18, 2013).)  Additionally, she expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for 
her actions.  (Tr., p.12, Ls.18-20.)  She also explained how she intended to prepare 
herself for her ultimate release back into society:  “I am looking at this prison sentence 
as optimistically to get to the work center to get a job, have money to get a place, car 
again, and build my life backup. . . . I am looking at this as a good thing instead of a bad 
thing and hopefully get my life together.”  (Tr., p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.6.)   
The district court’s statement in denying the motion to reduce her sentence in 
light of those mitigating factors – that it does not usually reduce sentences when 
revoking probation when the alleged violations involve new charges – is concerning 
because those new charges had already been addressed in another court.6  Cf. 
State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 230 (Ct. App. 1999) (“[W]hile the district court may 
properly take into consideration [the defendant’s] other criminal conduct, . . . sentence 
                                            
6 For example, the prosecutor informed the district court that Ms. Caruso had been 
ordered to serve a term of incarceration for the new felony charge underlying one of the 
alleged probation violations.  (See Tr., p.9, Ls.13-14. 
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must be rendered with the recognition that [the defendant] has already been sentenced 
for those related offenses, and the court’s focus at resentencing must be on 
determination for the appropriate sentence for the burglary that is before the court.”)  
While the consideration of the facts of the other cases here is not as direct or extensive 
as it was in Findeisen, the principle behind that decision is still applicable to 
Ms. Caruso’s case.   
In Ms. Caruso’s case, that principle indicates the district court’s expressed 
justification for not reducing the term of sentence – that the alleged violations included 
new charges – is not as strong as it might be in other cases; that this is one of 
the “unusual cases” where a sentence reduction is still appropriate.  (See Tr., p.13, 
Ls.24-25.)  That is evident from the mitigating factors in the record:  the sentence is 
being executed some nine years after it was originally imposed, Ms. Caruso 
demonstrated an ability to be successful on probation before suffering an injury which 
cost her her job, her sobriety, and her husband, and she has taken the first steps toward 
rehabilitation by expressing her remorse and accepting responsibility for her inability to 
maintain her sobriety after completing her most recent rider program.  Thus, the district 















Ms. Caruso respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems 
appropriate.  Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district court 
for a new disposition hearing. 
 DATED this 26th day of July, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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